I. The Rule Book
The AMC is the brainchild of F. James Sensenbrenner, a Republican Member of Congress from Wisconsin who had recently become Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee when he introduced H.R. 2325 in 2001.1 No hearings were held on the bill, and it was generally assumed to be going nowhere. At the last minute Chairman Sensenbrenner attached it to an appropriations bill, and it sailed up of esteemed and experienced antitrust experts-is dominated by people whose recent backgrounds strongly suggest a defense orientation. 8 In an article drafted before the Commissioners were appointed, I offered four generalizations to be gleaned from the statutory framework of the AMC. 9 First, because the statute provided almost no direction, it would be up to the Commission to define its own scope and priorities. 1 0 Second, whether Congress would achieve its objective of a politically balanced and broadly representative Commission would depend as much on the appointments of staff and expert consultants as on the appointment of Commissioners." l Third, the critical appointment would be that of the Chairperson, who is empowered to control the Executive Director and the staff. As Commission members are likely to be very busy part-timers, the staff would probably play a driving role on developing the agenda, priorities, spending choices, and Report wording. 1 2 Fourth, the ability to hold a large number of meetings, hear substantial amounts of testimony, retain specialized experts, and recruit a top quality staff would be influenced by the funding. Congress authorized a total of four million dollars for three years, which will presumably be doled out in annual appropriations. 1 3 This is not the first blue ribbon antitrust study commission. 1 4 Indeed, over the past seventy years, a new commission seems to have been born roughly once every generation. Some commissions have been established by Congress, 1 5 while some have been established by the Executive Branch.' 6 Their durations and resources have widely varied. Their assignments have sometimes been broad and sometimes been narrow. 17 Rarely have they had an immediate impact on legislation, but sometimes their long-term impact has been significant. 1 8 For example, the Temporary National Economic Commission ("TNEC") focused its attention on the role of industrial concentration, leading to the Celler-Kefauver amendments to the Clayton Act nine years later. 19 The TNEC membership was evenly balanced between the Administration and Congress. 20 The AMC, on the other hand, is made up of experts but does not include any Senators or members of Congress. When the AMC Report ("Report") is eventually submitted, there will 11. Id.
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[ Vol. 40 be no politicians with any foreseeable buy-in to the Report, other than Congressman Sensenbrenner. However, Congressman Sensenbrenner is not a member of the AMC and, because of term limits adopted by the Republicans, will not even be Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee when the Report is submitted.
II. The Game Plan for the First Half

A. Getting Organized
The first task of any study commission is to make the transition from statutory framework to physical reality. Appointments to the AMC were required to be made within sixty days of enactment of the law, and the three-year clock was to start running with the first meeting of the Commission. 2 1 The AMC appointment process was apparently not on the top of any politician's priority list because the appointments were not completed for sixteen months. 2 2 Indeed, the Commission's charter could not be filed until April 2, 2004. On June 28, 2004, the AMC issued its first press release, announcing the identification of the Chairperson (Deborah A. Garza) and the Vice Chairperson (Jonathan R. Yarowsky), the membership, and the schedule for its first public meeting. 23 Ms. Garza is a partner in the Washington D.C. office of Fried Frank. 24 The press release also announced 21 Once the Chair had appointed Heimert as Executive Director, the AMC needed to complete a variety of logistical tasks, such as the hiring of staff, finding a location for a physical office, compliance with the usual range of administrative filings, and establishment of a website. 28 Staff biographies may be found on the website.
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The first meeting opened with remarks by Congressman Sensenbrenner, the legislative father of the Commission. 30 In this and subsequent meetings, the AMC created "working groups" to suggest topics for study and called for public comments once the topics were selected. On January 8, 2005, the Commission identified an initial slate of twenty-five topics for study. 3 1 These selections were eventually revised, and individual Commissioners were named to work on particutracting Deb to become a leader in our antitrust department, Fried Frank has taken a major step in its effort to build the preeminent antitrust practice. Press Release, Fried Frank, Garza Joins Fried Frank as Antitrust Partner (Feb. 20, 2001 ), available at http://www.fflhsj.com/pressreleases/garza.htm.
25. The Chair appoints the Executive Director, subject to approval by the Commissioners. Antitrust Modernization Comm'n Act § 11056(a)(1). There is nothing on the record indicating that this appointment came to a vote.
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B. Developing the Agenda
How might a study commission, whose only assignment is to make recommendations relating to the possible modernization of antitrust, structure its agenda? Answering this question was the first major task of the AMC. One approach would be to begin with extensive data collection. "Modernization" presumably implies that some circumstances of importance to antitrust have changed and that these changes now require antitrust to also change by taking "modern" developments into account. Thus, one might start by comparing relevant aspects of the past political economy with the present political economy and perhaps with predictions about the future. Only after this task had been accomplished would the Commission then turn to policy recommendations. This approach was used by the TNEC, whose multivolume picture of the economy during the Great Depression was 32. See Memorandum from Andrew Heimert, Executive Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, to All Commissioners (Feb. 25, 2005), available at http:// www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/list-of-study-groups~rev.pdf (regarding "Study Groups").
33. At any early stage, these were deemed "working groups," and leaders were appointed, but once the specific topics were selected for study, the AMC's membership was assigned to leaderless "study groups." To not appoint what would in effect be subcommittee chairs might be viewed as a management decision to retain centralized control. In any event, it deprived the study groups of a formal leader with responsibility for developing and shepherding a program.
34 (1998) (1999) (2000) , are examples of the use of the targeting approach, in that their charters were more carefully delimited. The AMC, so lacking in statutory direction, decided to define its agenda by selecting for itself the specific questions that it would attempt to answer.
At its first public meeting on July 15, 2004, the AMC decided to solicit public comments on what issues it should study. 40 While waiting for comments, it would reach out to the "consumer, business, academic, legal, and enforcement communities" 4 1 for further enlightenment. At its second meeting-not scheduled untilJanuary 10, 2005-it would decide what issues to study. Someone must have noticed that the clock was ticking, because the next meeting was actually held on October 20, 2004 .42 At this meeting, eight working groups were established, and each Commissioner was appointed to serve on two or more groups. 4 3 The Executive Director reported that more than thirty-five individuals and organizations contributed public comments. 44 Finally, the AMC determined that the working groups, each At last, on January 13, 2005, the Commissioners took up a litany of specific questions prepared by the various working groups. 46 After introductions by the working group leaders, the Commissioners voted to take up twenty-nine questions, ranging from broad and controversial questions, such as "What should be the remedies and legal liabilities in private antitrust proceedings?" and "How does the current intellectual property regime affect competition?" to relatively simple and uncontroversial questions, such as "Should section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act (relating to criminal penalties) be repealed?" A few questions were deferred for further discussion.
The next public meeting, on March 24, attracted eight Commissioners and an audience of fifty, and it lasted a mere twenty-five minutes. 4 7 It had been scheduled to deal with only two matters that had been deferred. 48 The first matter was whether to study the topic of timetables for criminal and civil non-merger antitrust investigations by the FTC and Department of Justice ("DOJ") .
4 9 The Commissioners voted not to make this a separate issue for study, but to address the issue in the final Report they will submit to Congress.
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The second question was somewhat more sensitive. Assistant Attorney General Hewitt Pate had sent a letter to the AMC urging it to undertake or design a comprehensive empirical study of the costs and benefits of antitrust enforcement.
5 1 The Commissioners found themselves in the position of not wanting to offend the DOJ but, having already publicly committed themselves to an overwhelming menu of tasks, were reluctant to also undertake the type of comprehensive study being proposed. The Commissioners voted unanimously not to undertake the DOJ study, but rather to "undertake more limited empirical studies where appropriate as part of its consideration of issues 45 selected for further study and identify areas in which further empirical research could be useful."
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During the ensuing period, the AMC reviewed the approved study questions and reorganized the questions under slightly different topics, and "study groups" replaced "working groups" with Commissioners each assigned to one or more study groups. Each group produced a "study plan" that was reviewed and voted upon at the fifth public meeting on May 9.53 The adoption of nine study plans followed (Enforcement Institutions, Exclusionary Conduct, Immunities and Exemptions, International Antitrust, Merger Enforcement, New Economy, Regulated Industries, Remedies, and Robinson-Patman), with an agreement to publish them in the Federal Register with a request for public comments. 54 Each study plan listed the issues adopted for study and a series of questions for public comment. For example, the Enforcement Institutions Study Plan posed three questions about dual federal merger enforcement, four questions about differential merger enforcement standards, four questions about the allocation of merger enforcement among states, private plaintiffs, and federal agencies, and three questions about the role of states in enforcing non-merger antitrust laws.
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The plan also called for four (or possibly five) separate hearings with panels of witnesses. 5 6 The AMC adopted a tenth study plan, Criminal Insofar as has been revealed in public meetings, the approach selected by this panel of eleven lawyers and one economist is heavily legalistic. The Commission itself has neither undertaken nor contracted for new research. 64 If new information is to be taken into account, it will probably have to be furnished by the public, through formal comments or testimony. According to AMC staff, the single example of the Commission formally reaching out to stimulate volunteer consultants to produce desired research was the assignment given to Darren Bush (University of Houston Law Center), Gregory Leonard (NERA Economic Consulting), and Stephen Ross (University of 59 
C. The Role of the Public
The AMC's outreach until this point in time has reflected four phases: the informal seeking of suggestions from antitrust notables, a request for public comments on setting the agenda, the request for public comments on topics selected by the Commission for study, and public hearings.
Informal Outreach
Prior to its first public meeting, the Commission determined that it would initially reach out informally to the antitrust community for ideas about how to proceed and what topics to focus on. I was personally scheduled to visit with the Commission at its new offices for such a discussion. It turned out to be a one-hour unstructured conversation that included the Executive Director and three Commissioners who participated by conference call. There appears to be no public record of who else participated in this initial outreach program, nor is it clear whether other conversations were more productive than mine.
Request for Comments on the Agenda
On July 23, 2004, the Commission asked for public comments by September 30 on what issues it should study. 66 Thirty-eight comments were received. 67 Some comments, like those of the American Antitrust Institute ("AAI") and the American Bar Association ("ABA") Antitrust Section, 68 were broadly based; others dealt with specific issues of particular interest to the authors, such as the American Homeowners Grassroots Alliance, which was principally concerned with antitrust issues relating to the real estate industry, or the Americans for Tax Reform. exist to stifle productivity growth and development of new products and services. 69 After the Commission made its initial cut on topics for study, another eleven public comments were submitted, unsolicited. Five of these urged the Commission to reconsider its decision not to include the patent ambush issues. 70 Five urged the Commission not to attempt to reevaluate antidumping laws. 7 1 The eleventh criticized the Commission for not being responsive to public comments. 72 The Commission did respond, however, to the politicians' concerns that it lacked both the specific expertise and the statutory mandate to take up antidumping, by removing this subject from the agenda of topics.
Request for Public Comments on Substance
On May 19, 2005, the AMC requested that the public provide comments byJune 17, July 1, orJuly 15, 2005, depending on the topic for the first nine study plans. 73 In effect, this meant that an organization wishing to respond to all 176 questions in a timely fashion would have no more than four to six weeks to prepare all of its comments. Given that most organizations would require time to do research, write thoughtful comments, and clear them through any sort of committee or internal review process, this hardly seemed to be a welcoming invitation.
Ninety-four comments were filed in a timely fashion, with another twenty-nine filed by the end of October. 7 4 However, these numbers are misleading. Sixty-one of the 110 filings related to the Immunities and Exemptions Study Plan, and most of these were submitted by industries wishing to maintain their own current exemptions and immu-nities. 75 Moreover, of the remaining submissions, ten were submitted by the AAI, four were submitted by the International Chamber of Commerce, and three were submitted by sections of the ABA.
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The AAI, an independent non-profit organization, had prepared for the AMC by establishing volunteer working groups to parallel the AMC's study groups. With a streamlined internal review process and the flexibility to allow each working group to submit comments under its own identification, the AAI could address in some depth nearly all of the questions posed by the AMC. 77 It is anticipated that the Antitrust Section of the ABA will provide comments comparable in breadth. Working groups were established by the Antitrust Section to comment on various topics, but because the ABA's internal procedures proved sufficiently cumbersome, the first comments did not arrive at the AMC before late October 2005.78 An example would be the fourteen page, single-spaced filing on Octo-
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77. The Author served on every AAI working group and edited all papers to provide consistency both in formatting and in overall substantive positioning. Each paper represented a consensus of its working group, ascertained through telephone conferences and e-mail exchanges, but there were no votes taken, and no one member should be assumed necessarily to agree with all statements in the comments. The timing imposed by the AMC severely limited the potential for in-depth legal or economic research. Thus, the only AAI comment that provided new empirical data was the Comment on Criminal Remedies, in which attention was called to information that had recently been published by Professors John Connor and Robert Lande (two members of a working group chaired by attorney Kenneth Adams), showing that the harm caused by cartel pricing was significantly greater than previously thought. AM '79 On two of the more controversial issues addressed, the Antitrust Section's comments can be described as mild. "Absent a valid empirical basis," the Antitrust Section stated that it was "unwilling to recommend dramatic changes to the system of dual federal-state merger enforcement or to discount the criticisms of the system as it currently operates. 8 0
On the question of whether private enforcement should continue to be available to challenge mergers, the Antitrust Section suggested that the AMC "should not take any action to encourage or discourage any change to the system." 8 1
Hearings
As proven difficult to predict where most Commissioners will come out when votes are eventually taken.
A hearing usually lasts two hours. The full transcript is published after some delay and editing on the AMC's website. 8 4 With only four witnesses on a given topic, all viewpoints will obviously not be heard. Although the Commission has attempted to construct panels that represent several different constituencies in a generally balanced way, some efforts (e.g., exclusionary conduct and mergers) appear to have been less successful than others (e.g., treble damages).
By and large, very little if any "new" information has thus far been provided at the hearings. Instead, they are primarily occasions for well-informed advocates to promote previously developed positions relating to the matters before them. Some Commissioners (notablyJohn Shenefield, who had chaired an earlier blue ribbon antitrust study commission) have made it a point to illuminate areas of consensus and difference within the panels.
Thus, during the first half of its statutory life, the AMC organized itself, developed an agenda, obtained written public comments, and conducted various hearings. No policy recommendations had been decided, and it appeared that a lot of heavy lifting lay ahead.
III. The Second Half
A. The Timetable
As the Commission returns to the field to play the second half, what remains to be accomplished? By the end of February 2006, the staff is expected to have compiled summaries of the research and information gathered. 8 5 From March through May, the study groups and staff will prepare options for recommendations, and the Commission will begin meeting to deliberate on findings and recommendations.
8 6 A draft Report and recommendations are anticipated to be completed in August, and the Report should be finalized in December. 8 Out of the 176 questions targeted by the Commission, a few clusters are likely to prove most controversial and potentially important for the future of antitrust. I will call attention to seven of these.
Role of the States
The role of the state Attorneys General as antitrust enforcers has a long history, going back before the Sherman Act 88 in some states. However, it became much more salient during the Reagan Administration, a period when federal antitrust was in severe retrenchment. The fact that many of the states disagreed with the DOJ (not to mention Microsoft Corp.) in this generation's landmark monopolization case led to complaints that the states were an unnecessary complication and that they should be made to bow out of any cases involving interstate commerce. In the alternative, the states should bow out of any cases in which the federal antitrust enforcers had reviewed a matter or, had taken formal enforcement action.
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State representatives were rather pointedly left off of the AMC and have no obvious representative within the membership. Recognizing this disadvantage, the states and their coordinating arm, the National Association of Attorneys General, have been gathering data to demonstrate their importance within the overall scheme of antitrust enforcement and that the system is not broken. Some of this information was presented by Professor Harry First in his testimony to the Commission on October 26.90 Based on questioning by the Commissioners, one could surmise that most at risk may be the states' jurisdic- tion over mergers impacting more than one state, which is to say, most mergers.
The AAI working group advocated that the states maintain their current jurisdiction over mergers. More generally, it stressed the significant contributions made by the concurrent enforcement of antitrust laws by state and federal agencies, and it opposed any plan for imposed allocation of authority. 91 
Private Enforcement
It is estimated that over 90% of antitrust litigation is by private parties. 92 Both the statutory scheme and common law have combined to encourage antitrust litigants in certain ways, most notably through treble damages, joint and several liability, the no-contribution rule, and attorney fees for victorious plaintiffs. Perhaps in response, courts and Congress have adopted various techniques for making life more difficult for plaintiffs, such as the requirements for standing, 93 antitrust injury, 94 and evidentiary presumptions. 95 While virtually no one is advocating for the elimination of private actions, the defense bar and their clients have long been interested in finding additional ways to tie the hands of plaintiffs.
Among the ideas raised during the AMC's hearings are: (1) reduction of the circumstances under which treble damages are mandatory (e.g., applying them only to more serious per se cases such as horizontal price fixing or allowing the court to decide after trial whether to multiply damages), (2) eliminating joint and several liability and the no-contribution rule (thereby reducing plaintiffs' leverage to gain favorable settlements), and (3) allowing fee-shifting so that the loser will pay the attorneys' fees for both sides (as opposed to the current rule that the liable defendant pays the plaintiffs' attorneys fees).96 Because a high proportion of plaintiffs' antitrust cases are brought on a contingent fee basis, any of these changes could affect KovAcic [Vol. 40 the cost-benefit analysis that determines whether a private case will be brought. For example, elimination of treble damages would reduce the payoff for a victory (and likely reduce the starting point for settlement negotiations). Thus, both plaintiff lawyers and consumersneither of whom are represented on the Commission-are concerned about what the AMC will recommend.
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The AAI working group's comments argued against modifying the treble damage rule or making any procedural changes relating to civil antitrust remedies, other than to support the introduction of prejudgment interest. The working group supported continuation of awarding legal fees to a successful plaintiff and opposed changing the current rules relating to joint and several liability, contribution, and claim reduction. 99 Various groups, including an ABA task force, have advocated some form of federal statute to provide for a single federal court to handle such cases, with (or perhaps without) preemption of state indirect purchaser laws. 10 0 The AMC considers this complex issue so important that it allocated the subject two panels of five witnesses each. 10 1 The AAI working group agreed that states need to be allowed to have laws to protect indirect purchasers. It recommended that there be an opportunity to evaluate the impact of the recently passed Class Action Fairness Act' 0 2 before any effort is made to enact further reform. While it seems unlikely that the AMC will propose legislative revisions, it could attempt to provide expert guidance to courts and enforcers on standards for applying section 2. This territory is hotly contested between traditionalists and conservatives, the former tending to support government intervention and the latter tending to support non-interference.
The AAI working group urged that the appropriate standards should be allowed to emerge through the normal playing out of the common law. 1 0 7 Moreover, it does not interpret Trinko as having adopted any particular standard for treatment of refusals to deal.' 0 8 The working group supports the continuing development of the essential facilities doctrine. 0 9
Robinson-Patman Act
The Robinson-Patman Act" 0 ("R-P Act") outlaws certain types of price discrimination. The R-P Act is one of the laws that may facilitate control over power buyers, a phenomenon raising new levels of concern as giant retailers like Wal-Mart emerge. However, the AMC did not consider control over power buyers to be an issue worth considering in the process of modernizing. 111 The R-P Act has rarely been enforced at the federal level during the past thirty years, but it remains in effect, helping to shape much domestic commerce, and is often the subject of private litigation. Small business-which is not represented on the Commission-adamantly supports continuation of the R-P Act and its active enforcement. It appears likely that the AMC will recommend revisions or outright repeal of the R-P Act. It will almost certainly recommend repeal of criminal jurisdiction under the R-P Act, which is rarely if ever utilized and has few if any known supporters.
The AAI working group urged that the R-P Act be reformed, but that it not be repealed, and suggested three ways in which it might be made more consistent with contemporary ideas about antitrust policy.
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Mergers
While not taking on major questions about the purpose or effectiveness of anti-merger laws, or even whether industrial concentration itself should still be the basis of legal presumptions, the Commission appears to be particularly interested in matters of process and administration. One major philosophical question may sneak in, however: what role should efficiencies play in a merger antitrust case. In particular, there could be discussion of whether to apply the standard of total welfare or consumer welfare, a technical but controversial issue that calls into play the values underlying antitrust law.' 13 The AAI working group recommended against any changes in the statutory framework of the merger laws, but urged that concentration should still play a major role in merger analysis. 1 4 Most members of the working group supported the use of consumer welfare, as opposed to total welfare, as the standard for evaluating efficiency claims. 
Immunities and Exemptions
The AMC could in theory have taken evidence on each item in the long list of statutory immunities and exceptions that limit the applicability of antitrust laws. It quickly became obvious that the Commission did not have the time or resources to do this and that such an undertaking would not likely lead to legislation. A different agenda emerged, in which the AMC would try to develop a framework for Congress to examine each new (or renewed) request for an immunity or exemption. As mentioned previously, consultants are preparing such a framework.
1 16 Immunities and exemptions are generally the result of political power exercised on behalf of an industry, with the purpose of benefiting the industry rather than consumers. For this reason, any ammunition that would assist Congress in standing more firmly for the public interest would be desirable. It is conceivable that Congress might legislate a framework for itself that its members could point to when approached to support special interest antitrust legislation. This is potentially one of the most fruitful areas that the Commission has decided to pursue.
The AAI's working group urged creation of a methodology that, if adopted by Congress, could force Congress to closely examine certain questions before enacting special interest legislation. 
C. Will Any of It Matter?
The history of blue ribbon antitrust commissions in general does not suggest that the AMC's final Report will generate immediate legislative action. This particular Commission does not have politicians on board who are likely to champion enactment of the Report. Nor will the one politician who has shown interest, James Sensenbrenner, likely be in the privileged position as House Judiciary Committee Chairman, where his own leverage could be particularly useful in pushing forward a legislative agenda. This means that any legislative recommendations of the Commission will have to carry their own weight politically. Whether any legislative action will occur likely depends upon: (1) the substantive recommendations, (2) the style with which they are put forward, (3) the general political atmosphere at the time, and (4) who takes up the cause.
The Substantive Recommendations
It is too soon to know what substantive recommendations will be made. The previous section outlined some of the potential recommendations, e.g., a federal indirect purchaser law, modifications to the R-P Act, or revisions in the role of state or private enforcement. One can imagine that amending the R-P Act to knock out criminal jurisdiction would generate neither significant opposition nor excited support. However, a solution to the indirect purchaser problem has evaded legislators for a long time, and modifications to state or private enforcement or to the basic provisions of the R-P Act would likely stir up a hornet's nest of opposition.
Style
By style, I am referring to (1) quality of presentation, (2) emphasis, and (3) the handling of dissent. The quality of presentation will reflect organization and writing style. Will a committee style render the final Report readable only by devoted experts? Antitrust is a difficult enough topic to present to the lay public. Given the large number of topics and subtopics, many of which can only be of interest to experts, it will be a challenge to write something that will be read by more than a handful of antitrust lawyers and economists. There is also the matter of persuasiveness. How much information will be presented and how persuasive will the analysis be?
A related problem is that with so many different topics and subtopics in play, it may be difficult for a reader to see the forest for the trees. What message will come through? Will it be one that signals things are basically all right, but the common law needs to keep developing? Or will it be one that suggests that so many things are wrong that only severe surgery can save the economy? (I leave out a third scenario, which seems eminently desirable to me but most unlikely: that the Report will say that what is needed is more antitrust, aggressively and creatively applied, to keep an evolving economy flexible, innovative, and serving consumers with choice and competitive prices).
Finally, how will the Report handle dissent? Will individual or groups of Commissioners be inclined to write dissents? One route would be to suppress dissent by only reporting majority recommendations and findings. Another option would be to only make recommendations for which there is unanimity among the Commissioners. Since this would likely result in a very brief report, the real question is how much space to devote to disagreements. Should they merely be footnoted? Should dissenters be permitted adequate space to explain their reasons? The latter may offend majoritarians, but is likely to prove more useful in the long run. It would help to illuminate not only the existence and reasons for disagreement, but the degree of consensus that surrounds any given issue. A failure or refusal to incorporate conflicting information, interpretations, and recommendations into the Report would almost ensure that they will find their way into the public light through other means, which may only undermine the Report's credibility.
The Political Scene
The political landscape at the time the Report will be issued is an unknown. A set of legislative recommendations decided upon in the expectation of a conservative Republican Congress and White House would very likely have a lesser chance of enactment if elections develop a different picture. Unpredictable economic circumstances, such as a depression or large-scale corporate scandals, could also have a major impact. Depending upon the precise recommendations, various interest groups can be expected to push back in the normal political course of events.
Who Will Take Up the Cause?
I was asked by one of the Commissioners, "Why are the states, the plaintiffs' bar, and consumers so intensely concerned about what we are doing? All we can do is make recommendations."
The answer is that the Commission can start the ball rolling, and no one knows where the momentum will take it. Lobbyists worry about a bill being introduced because one day the bill (originally no more than a recommendation) may become law, and many resources will have to be spent trying to influence the course of the bill, whose future passage, defeat, or form cannot prudently be taken for granted.
We do not know who will be making decisions about antitrust two, five, or ten years from now, but ideas once put into circulation by a credible blue ribbon commission might find champions in the future. [Vol. 40 Moreover, the test of a blue ribbon commission's effectiveness is not limited to legislation. The AMC's Report could influence the other institutions that frequently play an even more important role within the antitrust community-the federal and state enforcement agencies, the courts, the antitrust bar, and academics.
As the AMC team comes back onto the field after a somewhat slow first half, the antitrust crowd watches eagerly, hopeful for a fair, spirited, and high quality contest of ideas.
